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Linowes: Neglected Areas In Acquisition Evaluations

Many mergers fail because managements, sub
merged by tactical details, do not take time—in
time—for strategical planning. The major elements
of such planning, particularly the use of person
nel, are reviewed in this analysis of—
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merger transaction and so few peo
ple available to do this work that in
the great majority of cases practical
ly all planning is on the tactical
level. The immensely important
strategical planning effort is post
poned to a later date. That later
date comes after the merger has
been consummated—and then it is
too late.
Strategy vs. tactics

The tactical aspects of a merger
transaction include the price nego
tiations, product analysis, evaluation
the company’s status in its indus
try, the determination of asset val
ues and liabilities to be assumed, le
gal matters, terms
payment for
the purchase, and relationships with
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Stalls zfcc • - •
...realigning executive personnel

...consolidating production facilities

...consolidating executive functions

...cutting back some divisions
...expanding others

strategical aspects of a merger involve the long-term relationships between the
acquired company and the acquiring company. Planning should be complete enough
to carry the merged complex at least three years beyond the merger date.

retiring executives of the company
being acquired. These tactical fac
ets all involve questions whose an
swers are signed, sealed, and deliv

ered on the merger date or within
a
of thereafter. Too fre
few months
quently all attention during merger
negotiations is directed to these tac
tical matters at the expense of stra
tegical matters.
The strategical aspects
a mer
ger involve the long-term relation
ships between the acquired com
pany and the acquiring company.
They include plans for realigning
executive personnel, plans for
consolidating production facilities,
plans for consolidating executive
functions, plans for cutting back
some of the divisions of the ac
quired company and expanding
other divisions, plans for entering
new market areas, plans for enlarg
ing the product line of the com
pany acquired, plans for consoli

dating the research and develop
ment laboratories
both compa
nies, plans for consolidating the
sales and distribution organizations
of both companies, plans for insti
tuting centralized or decentralized
controls, and many other types of
projections,
designed to carry
the merged complex at least three
vears beyond the merger date.
All highly successful mergers
have had substantial elements of
this strategical planning. The fact
that such planning has been done is
often obvious from the announce
ments that are made at the time of
the public disclosures of such mer
gers. These announcements set forth
concrete plans for the operation and
integration of the new facilities. The
Ford Motor Company’s acquisition
of Philco Corporation is an example.
Plans were stated at the time of the
announcement
the acquisition
and have been carried out.
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This aspect
planning is not al
ways identified as a separate aspect
of a merger projection. In some
form or other, however, it is essen
tial. Ideally,
emphasize the im
portance
long-term merger plan
ning, every evaluation of a merger
should provide clearly for a sepa
rate strategical study.
Management

One of the most important in
gredients of strategical planning is
personnel planning, particularly the
planning of the management or
ganization. Many otherwise promis
ing acquisitions founder because of
the acquiring company’s failure ade
quately to evaluate the management
people for the long pull. Because
this is
one of the most difficult
tasks in strategical merger planning,
much of the emphasis in this article
will be on this subject.
Management Services
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The primary object of any busi
ple through what they have created
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uals, and the like. In recent years
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behavioral scientists have demon
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an effective management team. No
strated that the relationships which
matter how valuable the physical
are formalized in this way are only
Creativity vs. order
plant may be or how protective the
one facet of the essential dealings
patents or trademarks may be, no
that go to make up the working as
To have capacity for future con
profits can be created unless there is
sociations of the executive team. It
structive progress a department
adequate management to convert
has been proved that much manage
must be dynamic and vital. If vi
these dormant assets into working
ment progress originates and is de
tality and enthusiasm permeate the
mechanisms.
veloped through the informal con
department, it is a good indication
People are the tangible part an
tacts one executive has with another,
that the executive himself is dy
organization. These people must be
whether it be on the golf course,
namic and enthusiastic. In a pro
evaluated not only terms
what
over cocktails, or walking to the
gressive organization a spirit of con
they do and what they have done
commuter train.
structive self-criticism pervades the
but also in terms
what they can
How do we go about evaluating
air. Differences of opinion have a
do in the future, which means their
abilities and organizational relation
medium for outlet and are not sup
intangible abilities.
ships when measuring standards are
pressed in the interest of harmony.
It is not enough, however,
inadequate or nonexistent? We do
Honest, forthright expressions di
evaluate each executive in isolation.
this by studying management peo
rected toward the department’s

The management hierarchy increases a company's wealth by converting dormant assets into working mechanisms.
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I omorrow’s success depends on today’s vitality and innovativeness . . .

jectives and its ultimate good are
not stifled.
The current success of a depart
ment is directly attributable to the
vitality and dynamism of the or
ganization in the recent past. To
morrow’s success depends on the
vitality and innovativeness that ex
ist today.
These characteristics cannot be
measured quantitatively, of course.
Yet much can be learned by talking
to and observing executives, man
agers, and submanagers.
Look into each executive’s typical
work day. Too much emphasis need
not be placed on tidy surroundings
and rigid schedules. A smoothly
running office and a neat, orderly
desk may be evidence of efficiency—
but not necessarily.
Take the case the Y Electronics
Company, which had been in busi
ness about four years when it was
acquired by a much larger company.
The Y Company had been started

by a physicist and an engineer, each
in his thirties, who had previously
worked for a large, very successful
electronics company. They had left
their former positions to set up their
own company make a “new type’’
of electronic component for which
demand was quite heavy and con
stantly increasing. The company
had shown excellent progress, with
sales and profits more than doubling
each of the three years imme
diately preceding the merger. At the
time it was acquired it employed
more than one hundred people.
The physicist president turned
administrator kept the plant and of
fice in immaculate condition. Clean
liness and orderliness were given
top priority. Every item had
designated slot. The purchaser’s rep
resentatives investigating Y Com
pany were very impressed by the
apparent efficiency with which the
business was conducted—so much so
that they completely overlooked as

sessing the creativity
the man
agement.
About a year and a half after the
acquisition, however, sales leveled
off. Many of Y Company’s cus
tomers were setting up their own
facilities to make the component,
and sales resistance stiffened.
It was obvious that new products
were urgently needed. But, try as
they might, the young physicist and
the young engineer could not come
up with anything to supplement the
lagging sales. They lacked the imag
ination and creativity to develop
anything original. It turned out that
the idea for the “new type” of com
ponent upon which their business
was started was actually originated
by another electronics engineer
with whom they had been associ
ated
their former employment.
Rising profits turned into losses
within three years of the acquisition.
The business was still conducted
smoothly and everything was tidy-

of

Neatness and order are not evidence of efficiency if a company lacks the
creative talent needed to come up with new products when required.
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An executive who never differs with his superior is ineffective; so is the
superior who puts harmony within management ahead of accomplishment.

everything but the profit and loss
statement.
Some of the most effective man
agement men find it impossible
work in neat, compartmentalized

units of time. They have creative
minds. While they are dictating a
letter on one subject, they may get
an idea on a completely unrelated
matter. Creative people know that
thoughts and ideas are fluid and
evasive. In the middle of one project
they frequently stop to make a note
of an idea or direct a subordinate to
explore a thought in a completely
unrelated area.
Creative executives may have half
a dozen balls in the air at one time.
So long as they have the managerial
ability to follow through—or arrange
to have someone follow through—on
the job that is most important at the
time, this is healthy. On the other
hand, an executive may have a ple
thora of ideas but lack the ability to
apply them effectively to the work
of his department. This is danger
ous.
Relationships

Relationships between superior
and subordinate can be very reveal
ing. An executive who never differs
with his superior is ineffective; so is
the superior who puts harmony
November-December, 1964
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ahead of accomplishment. As some
one has said, when two executives
always agree, one of them is su
perfluous.
There is no room for “yes” men in
industry today. Business is too dy
namic. Our times and our technol
ogy are changing too rapidly. Every
mind in a key position in business
must be dedicated independently
and cooperatively
its maximum
practical capacity for the advance
ment of the organization.
Harmony at AH Corporation

Jones, the president
a large
publicly held company, had come
up through the industrial relations
department. It wasn’t planned that
way, but when the sudden death of
the corporation’s youthful president
left the field wide open, the board
of directors turned to the then indus
trial relations vice president, who
had been with the company for fif
teen years. Everyone liked former
public relations man Jones, and as
president he was proud
the
friendly air that soon dominated the
entire executive hierarchy.
When Jones’s AB Corporation
was acquired by another company,
it had a good history, a
earnings
record, and sales of about $40 mil
lion a year. President Jones had

then been in office about a year and
a half.
The policy of the acquiring com
pany had always been not to inter
fere in the management
a com
pany it acquired if things were go
ing well. On the surface, the busi
ness appeared to function smoothly.
All the executives were loyal and de
voted to Jones. They always seemed
to agree with any statement he
made, and it was apparent that
there was warm friendship between
Jones and his management team.
However, the AB Corporation
manufactured consumer products
for a competitive market, and com
petition was keen. Gradually some
of the sales of the AB Corporation
began to slip. In response to in
quiries from the parent company
the president made the usual ex
cuses of cut-throat competition,
lowered demand for the product,
and temporary slack for inventory
adjustment by customers. His ex
ecutive team always agreed with his
analyses.
Within three years annual volume
had dropped from $40 million to
$20 million, and the long history of
profits had turned into losses. Then
the parent company sent in
own
investigators.
They found that competition had
run far ahead of the AB Corpora17

5

Management Services: A Magazine of Planning, Systems, and Controls, Vol. 1 [1964], No. 5, Art. 3
tion’s products. Product design was
poor, and the promotion campaigns
were ineffective. The sales vice
president and the production and
engineering vice president, both of
whom had been there for many
years, said that on several occasions
they had tried to improve the prod
uct designs and the sales campaigns.
Each time, however, President
Jones had his own ideas and “be
cause he was always
nice about
it” they went along with him. Ever
since Jones’s assumption of the
presidency his platform had been
that harmony and friendship come
first.
Careful, perceptive interviewing
of the president and his executives
during the acquisition investigation
could have brought this lopsided
operating philosophy
light. Then
corrective action could have been
taken before the business was so
disastrously affected.
An executive worth his salt from
time to time makes suggestions and
observations to his superiors which
will benefit the entire organization,
not just his own department. A good
executive does not find it necessary
run to his superior for important
decisions — decisions for which he
has full authority and responsibil
ity.
Nineteenth hole
Appropriate study of the informal re
lationships among executives can give
the analyst a clue as to where the
decisions are really coming from.

In one acquisition X Corporation,
the acquired company, was organ
ized in the traditional way, with the
vice presidents reporting to the
president and the president him
self reporting to the chairman
the board. The company was well
established in its
supplying
specialized fabricated parts pri
marily to the automobile industry.
Orders were large, with the bulk
of the volume coming from Gen
eral Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
The key to getting business from
these giants was to convince their
purchasing and engineering depart
ments that
Corporation’s fabri
cated small products were as good
as, or better than, its competitors’
and that X Corporation understood
the needs of the auto industry and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices/vol1/iss5/3
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was always prepared to fill those
needs. The vice president for mar
keting, who had been with the com
pany for more than twenty years,
personally opened the preliminary
discussions with the large customers
and set the stage for his salesmen
and engineers to follow through as
each new automobile model design
was completed. In the normal
course
business the vice presi
dent for marketing reported to and
consulted with the president.
As part of the acquisition reor
ganization the chairman of the
board was retired, and he moved
out the community to enjoy daily
golf in Florida. This was the only
change in the executive manage
ment structure.
During the first year of merger
sales held firm. But in the second
year, despite the vice president for
marketing’s projection of higher
sales because
expected increased
auto production, sales fell off. And
sales continued
decline
suc
ceeding years.
Investigation disclosed that in
past years the vice president for
marketing had regularly played golf
each week with the then chairman
of the board. The board chairman
had been with X Corporation for
more than thirty years. Having
come up through the marketing de
partment, he knew most of the key
people in the purchasing and engi
neering departments of the automo
tive companies and understood
their problems and needs. He never
lost touch with his old friends in
the industry. At the weekly golf
sessions—and especially on the nine
teenth hole—the vice president for
marketing and the chairman would
discuss the work of the marketing
department. By this means the
chairman regularly guided the sales
effort
X Corporation. With his
removal from the company and the
community, the vice president for
marketing was thrown completely
on his own—and he could not meas
ure up to the task.
An appropriate study of the in
formal relationships among the
executives could very well have
brought to light the fact that

6
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The entire area of motivation is one that requires thoughtful analysis
well before the acquisition is consummated. If the acquired company's
incentive programs can not be continued, new ones must be substituted.

important marketing suggestions
and decisions actually were coming
from the board chairman. With this
knowledge protective steps could
have been taken before so much
business was lost.
Although this method of research
would not have been effective in the
case just cited, it is often revealing
to peruse some of the memoran
dums exchanged between an execu
tive and his superior. Sometimes
they give a clue as to where the
ideas and decisions are coming
from.
A review of office records is help
ful in determining whether an ex
ecutive sets objectives for himself
and his department and then meets
these objectives. It is the results
a department that count, not the
personality of the executive or the
friendly relations that may exist
within the department.
Lateral relationships

It is also advisable to look into
an executive’s relationships with his
colleagues, with fellow executives
on the same level
authority as
his own. An effective executive is
respected but not necessarily loved.
Respect comes from recognition
that he has ability and integrity
and makes a real contribution to
November-December, 1964
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the workings of his organization.
A good executive communicates
well with his colleagues as well as
with others. He is not so oppressed
by the day-to-day operations of his
own department that he does not
have the time or interest to discuss
strategic problems of the over-all
business with his colleagues.
The good executive keeps his ob
jectives foremost in his mind and
bends and molds his means to re
spond to the needs of his colleagues
so long as it does not interfere with
the end product. In short, the effec
tive executive is not a quibbler, and
he always keeps his eye on the
doughnut, not on the hole.
Motivation

Another area for investigation is
that of executive motivation. What
have been the primary motivations
of the executives? If management
was driven by a desire to build a
good business so that it could be
sold at a substantial capital gain,
then after the merger there may be
no further incentive
produce. Or
perhaps the organization has been
run by a dynamic chief executive
officer who drove his men hard and
made
the decisions. Will he con
tinue to exercise such a dominant
influence? Do you want him to?

In many instances executives are
given incentives through stock op
tions or other incentive compensa
tion programs. If these executives
are to continue with the company,
it may be necessary either to con
tinue these or equivalent incentive
programs or to substitute new ones.
The entire area of motivation is one
that requires thoughtful analysis
well before the acquisition is con
summated. It should not be left
to casual—or desperate—treatment
many months after lower morale
has set in.
Evaluating an organization, even
as set down in charts, manuals, and
records, is extremely difficult. When
we recognize that for a full evalua
tion we must place substantial em
phasis on the informal relationships
among the executives, it immediate
becomes apparent that such an
evaluation is a formidable task.
Yet no one should be deterred
from this task by its difficulty. To
avoid weighing all of these facets
in sizing up an organizational struc
ture may be quite disastrous after
the legal merger papers have been
executed and integration of the
newly acquired company begins. It
is ironic that most companies spend
more time evaluating the qualifica
tions of individual executives whom
they are considering employing than
19
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they do in evaluating the large
the opinions and judgments
the
group of executives that they expect
chief executive officer of the acquir
to employ at one time through the
ing company or by his own eager
acquisition route.
ness to “make a deal” and earn a
fat fee.
of
Above all, he must not be a “yes”
Evaluator
man. A merger transaction must not
be unrealistically dominated by a
Generally, when an acquiring
strong executive or a self-serving
company attempts to evaluate a
consultant; there is too much at
prospective acquisition, the acquir
stake.
misstep in a merger trans
er calls in consultants who are spe
action
can
in a few months put in
cialists. The acquirer consults his
jeopardy
an
industrial empire that
auditors to verify the financial state
took
decades
—sometimes genera
ments of the company to be ac
tions
—
to
build.
The Olivetti Com
quired; he consults with lawyers to
pany
’
s
acquisition
of the Under
review the legal affairs of the cor
wood
Corporation
is
an example of
poration; he may consult with en
how
an
acquisition
can
threaten the
gineers to study the productive ca
A company can improve
financial
stability
of
a
great
indus
pacity and with marketing men to
trial
complex.
This
acquisition
study the product demand.
its batting average in any
caused such a drain on the finances
The chief executive of the acquir
of Olivetti that a consortium of Ital
ing company then attempts to co
acquisition program by
ian financiers had to be called in to
ordinate the findings of all of these
bolster its financial structure.
specialists and at the same time tries
adding the services of a
The generalist might be an ac
to place a value on the company
countant, a lawyer, an economist, an
be acquired. He does all this while
generalist to those
investment banker, or a man trained
attempting to project the feasibility
some other business-oriented
of integrating this new acquisition
of such specialists as
discipline. He may be an outside
into his own company’s affairs. This
consultant or a full-time executive
is a horrendous task, which places
auditors, lawyers, engineers,
of the company. If he is an execu
a tremendous burden of responsibil
tive, however, he should report di
ity on one executive and his tight
and marketing men.
rectly to a committee of the board
group of intimate internal advisors.
of directors rather than to the chief
It is small wonder that so many ac
The generalist can draw on
executive officer. The important re
quisitions prove to be unsuccessful.
quirement is that he have authority
A company can improve its bat
the specialists9 findings
and responsibility to evaluate
ting average in any acquisition pro
broad brush strokes. This evaluation
gram by adding the services of a
in evaluating the
would be made objectively and pro
generalist to those of the several
fessionally
and would be backed up
specialists. This generalist, after be
proposed acquisition.
by
his
own
technical skills and those
ing informed of the objectives
of
the
specialists
with whom he con
the acquiring company and famil
sults.
iarizing himself with the general
This procedure makes it possible
capacities and abilities of its execu
for
the chief executive officer of the
tives, then proceeds to evaluate the
acquiring
company and his col
organization and net worth
leagues
to
apply most
their at
the company to be acquired. The
tention to the task of evaluating the
generalist’s evaluation is based on
effects of the merger on the opera
his analysis of the people and the
tions of both companies. Thus they
profits, guided by the findings of
can concentrate on the strategical
any specialists who might be avail
aspects of the merger without being
able to him.
distracted by tactical questions.
It is important that the generalist
performing this function be inde
pendent of the top management
Information
the acquiring company and that he
not be compensated on a contin
Those assigned to make evalua
gent fee basis. This is so that his
tions of the seller’s organization
findings will not be influenced by
should be made—and kept—privy
20
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Plans for the operation of an acquired company should be outlined to
those concerned as soon as the merger is effected. This is the best
way to avoid the demoralizing effects of rumors, uncertainty, and fear.

to the philosophy, objectives, and
plans of the purchaser.
Tentative plans might call, for ex
ample, for the enlarging of the re
sponsibility of a particular
execu
of
tive office in the acquired company.
If so, the acquiring company should
be satisfied that the executive occu
pying this position in the company
acquired has the capacity to take on
more responsibility. If it appears
that he does not have the capacity,
appropriate and timely arrange
ments will have to be made to re
place him.
On the other hand, the acquiring
company might be planning to
abolish a department because the
merger would create duplication ol
a function. If the executive heading
this department is capable, adapt
able, and innovative, thought should
be given to absorbing him in some
other function in the merged com
plex so that his experience and abil
ities will not be lost to the organiza
tion.
Plans and projections of this type
should be completed before a merg
er is finally consummated so that
the program can be outlined
those concerned soon as the merg
er is effected. This avoids the de
moralizing effects of the rumors, un
certainty, and fear that so frequent
ly follow in the wake of a merger
announcement.
Evaluating an organizational team
requires close personal contact
November-December, 1964
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between the representatives
the
acquiring company and the ex
ecutives and managers of the com
pany being acquired. Thus, consid
erable tact, a broad knowledge of
business organization structure, and
a pleasant personality are required
carry out this phase
the inves
tigation.
Objections

The question may be raised
whether such a study would not
cause serious disturbance to the
management personnel
the busi
ness. The answer is that it need not,
provided it is handled properly.
First, such an organizational eval
uation would not be undertaken un
less the top managements
both
the buying company and the selling
company believed that it would be
mutually advantageous for them to
get together. Second, once the top
management of a company has de
cided to sell and a serious potential
purchaser has presented himself, all
executives should be informed. This
information cannot be kept secret
in any event. If the executives and
managers are not kept informed,
they will have to rely on rumors
follow the progress of sale negotia
tions, and this can have a serious
effect upon morale.
In merger evaluations it is essen
tial to keep the objective in mind at
all times. The objective is a success

ful, mutually beneficial merger.
Both parties suffer when a merger
is unsuccessful—through loss of
profits after the merger and through
the traumatic experiences of the
personnel involved, which sooner
later have their effect on the opera
tions of the business.
If the acquisition still
desir
able after completion of the organ
izational evaluation and other as
pects of the strategical analysis,
then the acquiring company should
by all means go ahead. Whether the
acquirer pays 10 per cent more or
less for a company is relatively un
important in the long run so long
as the over-all strategy evaluation
adds up to a plus factor. But if this
strategical evaluation points up in
surmountable problems or leaves
too many essential questions unan
swered, then the acquisition should
be rejected even if it can be made
at a discount.
It is an observable truth that a
company priced at $20 million could
be an excellent acquisition, in terms
both price and over-all business
objectives, for one acquiring com
pany, whereas the very same selling
company at a price of $10 million
would be an unsound acquisition
for another company. This paradox
will always hold so long as business
philosophies and objectives differ
and so long
human beings’ per
sonalities, abilities, and characters
differ.
21
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